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CONGRESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
FERMEL HEADY* AND ELEANOR TABOR LINENTHALt
In the long history of the development of the process of administrative regulation
in this country, the controversies that have taken place and the decisions that have
been made have inevitably centered in the Congress of the United States. In our
governmental system, the action of Congress has been required to put into effect
programs of government regulation, to create the agencies of implementation through
which these programs are to be achieved, to determine the balance of relationships
between the government as regulator and the private regulatees, and in general to
determine the characteristics of administrative regulation in our increasingly complex
social and economic system. This is not to imply by any means that Congress has
been the exclusive agent of authoritative choice in these matters. The courts have
shaped the administrative process in a multitude of cases reflecting judicial views as
to the permissible scope and method of regulatory action. The President is in a
constitutional position to participate with Congress in the enactment of legislation
and has frequentiy done so with decisive effect in this area. Moreover, and of even
greater importance, the President, as chief of administration, can easily influence the
development of regulatory administration, especially as it has become more closely
identified with the executive branch of government. Spokesmen for organized
groups outside government, particularly representing the legal profession and
economic interests subject to regulation, have vigorously pressed their views upon
the responsible governmental officials. At the center of this array of contending
forces, however, is Congress. It may often play a passive rather than an initiating
role, but its sanction must be secured. This is so because of its constitutional status
and because of the impressive combination of legislating, appropriating, investigating,
confirming, and related powers at its disposal.
Our purpose here is to describe the history of the efforts of Congress to cope
with the problems of administrative regulation. If what has already been said is
substantially correct, then it follows that the administrative process as it now func-
tions is primarily the consequence of congressional action and reflects the cumulative
judgment of Congress as to proper public policy in this area of governmental con-
cern. In general and in the long run, Congress has been the sponsor and molder
of our present system of administrative regulation, and has resisted strong urgings
for its drastic reform or elimination. As Kenneth C. Davis has commented,'
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[the] undeniable fact still remains that the community as a whole, expressing itself
through repeated legislative action, federal, state, and local, steadfastly rejects conclusions
that the growth of the administrative process should be resisted and opposed. Indeed, the
long battle over the fundamental desirability of establishing administrative agencies and
of continuing to rely upon their processes is rapidly diminishing and may be about ended.
Of course, this generalization does not imply uniformity and consistency in
congressional treatment of problems of regulatory administration. Accompanying
this long-range support given to the administrative process, Congress has shown a
succession of concerns about the nature of regulatory agencies and their operating
methods. In the following discussion, we have identified in chronological order four
periods, each evidencing a different emphasis for congressional attention and action
contemplated or taken. There are no distinct transitions from one phase to the
next, and the correct characterization of shifts in congressional intent is certainly
subject to dispute, but we believe that this account accurately reflects the important
trends.
The first of these periods is the longest, but will receive the least attention here.
It extends from the beginnings of what we now call the administrative process to the
decade of the x93o's. During this time, the pattern of administrative regulation was
established and its significance expanded tremendously. These developments came
mainly in the twentieth century, although they began earlier. Kenneth C. Davis
estimates that about one-third of federal peacetime agencies were created before
goo, and another third before i93oY
The period produced the familiar combination of legislative, executive, and
judicial type powers in regulatory agencies, particularly the so-called independent
regulatory commissions. It brought the growth of administrative law, described by
Arthur Vanderbilt as "the outstanding legal development of the twentieth century,
reflecting in the law the hegemony of the executive arm of the government.:"
Despite the implications of this comment on the legislative-executive balance of
power in our constitutional system, Congress made possible and in general facilitated
the remarkable expansion of the administrative process that occurred.
In recent years, despite continued general support to the existing system for
administrative regulation, Congress has shown a recurrent interest in re-examination
and possible reform of the administrative process. In its first phase, during the
decade of the 'thirties, this took the form of proposals for drastic alterations, cul-
minating in the passage in 1940 of the Walter-Logan bill,4 which failed to go into
effect only because of a presidential veto. Following this event, and continuing until
recently, has come a period of emphasis upon procedural uniformity with only minor
adjustments in the basic machinery, exemplified by the Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946 (APA),5 which continues to be the landmark effort by Congress to improve
2 d. § 1.04.
aVanderbilt, Introduction to BERNARD ScVwARTz, FREN CH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-
LAW WoRLD at xiii (1954).
IS. 915, H.R. 6324, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. (1939).
$6o Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§ ioo-11 (95 8 ).
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the administrative process. Now Congress seems to be entering a period of
reexamination as to the finality of the current procedural code and of exploration
of proposals, both old and new, for solutions to commonly recognized deficiencies in
administrative regulation. The direction in which Congress will choose to go is
still uncertain, but the more likely paths can be mapped out.
We will now examine more closely the role played by Congress in appraising
the administrative process during each of these three chronological periods covering
the last three decades.
I
Tim, CAMPAIGN TO RESHAPE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Despite the willingness of Congress to assist in the growth of the administrative
process, there were always those in Congress who deplored what was taking place.
In i886, when the Interstate Commerce Act was under consideration, Representative
Oates declared: "I believe it is absolutely unconstitutional and void, because to my
mind it is a blending of the legislative, the judicial, and perhaps, the executive power
of the Government in the same law."'
As the scope of the administrative process broadened and the importance of
administrative regulation increased, such grave misgivings were repeated by those
both in and out of Congress who opposed the combining of legislative and judicial
functions, and who further decried that judicial self-denial that served to aid and
abet this tendency. Louis Caldwell commented: 7
So far as I know, not a single federal decision declares or even hints that it is unconsti-
tutional to combine judge with prosecutor or legislator, and there are many decisions
which can be cited as giving tacit approval to that combination.
James M. Beck's Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy, was an extreme but widely
publicized expression of aversion to the administrative process.
In Congress, one early indication of reappraisal was the introduction by Senator
Norris, in January 1929, of a proposal for a court of administrative justice. In support
of this bill,8 the senator stated :?
... It creates no innovations, but it does propose to reorganize and simplify the procedure
of securing judicial review of administrative acts and decisions. The bill merely provides
for the consolidation of certain special courts, the transfer to the consolidated court of the
jurisdiction now exercised by those special courts and by the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia, the simplification of procedure, and recognition of the practice, in extra-
ordinary proceedings against officers of the Government, of having them represented in
whole or in part by their own subordinates who are especially skilled in the laws of
controversy....
' Quoted in i DAvis, op. cit. supra note i, § 1.o9 n.o.
' Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 966, 975 (1936).
8 S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929).
S70 CONG. REc. 1032 (1929).
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Senator Norris directed attention to the existence of a similar institution-a single
court to hear and determine all claims and controversies with the government-in
France and the various subdivisions of the German Republic, though he clearly
indicated no desire for a breadth of jurisdiction in the American model comparable
to that enjoyed abroad.1 ° Nothing further came of the bill; Senator Norris had
apparently expected and hoped for no more than discussion of its objectives in a
general way, by members of Congress, by government officials, by attorneys gen-
erally, and by the people at large.
By 1932, notice was directed to the "growing quantity of delegated legislation"
and "numerous offices, boards, and commissions authorized to make administrative
orders, rules, and regulations. ' By 1934, a committee report of the American Bar
Association had been released that urged first, the creation of a federal administra-
tive court, with an appellate division and accompanying branches and subdivisions;
second, that judicial review of administrative acts should include appeal on facts as
well as law; and third, that existing boards and commissions should be abolished 2
A bill proposing a federal administrative court was again introduced in 1936, but
had little impact. This bill, designed to achieve, inter alia, the consolidation of the
Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court,
and the Board of Tax Appeals--"an independent agency in the executive branch
of the government"-did not have the sponsorship of the American Bar Associa-
tion.13 Yet, to many, this bill represented a major stride forward in the control of
administrative adjudication.
Despite the emphasis in this period upon the merits and desirability of a federal
administrative court, a new approach began to gather strength. For its proponents,
the creation of an administrative court appeared to be a step "in derogation of the
regular courts" and further, would not "reach and control the administrative process
at its source." Further, by 1938, there were those who argued that'
4
... any reform in the procedure for judicial review of administrative decisions should
commence with the administrative processes themselves . . . that by such improvements
the necessity for judicial review will be reduced to a minimum.
10 ibid.
" Haines, Effect of the Growth of Administrative Law Upon Traditional Anglo-American Legal
Theories and Practices, 26 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 875, 876-77 (932).
12 This report is critically reviewed in Phillips, An American View of Administrative Law, 52 L.Q.
REv. 25 (936). The prevailing English position is distinguished on three grounds, in that the Commit-
tee on Ministers' Powers (i) "briefly and without hesitation" had advised against a regularized system
of administrative courts; (2) had opposed "emphatically" appeals on issues of fact; and (3) "deliberately"
had set out to establish administrative bodies with a maximum of freedom from political influence.
21 See generally 6o A.B.A. REP. 136 (1936), for a discussion of the committee report.
"'McGuire, Current Administrative Law Proposals, 3 FaD. B.AJ. 239, 242 (1938). A 1937 report
of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law had proposed control of
administrative agencies via elaborate procedural safeguards and comprehensive judicial review of rules,
orders, and decisions. The draft bill that resulted was altered in 1938 and again in 1939. The latter
version became S. 915 (Walter-Logan) and represented abandonment of two previously prevailing
approaches to control of the administrative process-namely, (i) consolidation of legislative courts into
administrative courts; and (2) the abolition of many independent agencies.
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The Walter-Logan bill, which was officially sponsored by the American Bar
Association, marked the culmination of this phase of congressional activity. The
terms of this proposal, and the debate that it generated, thrust into sharp focus the
change in direction of congressional thinking on the matter of its role vis-a-vis
administrative regulation. Via this measure, for the first time, Congress sought to
meet the clamor for administrative reform by the device of prescriptions for uniform
procedures. The implementing provisions, however, were not designed to strengthen
the functions of administrative agencies. To the contrary, in the view of many
serious critics of the proposal, who themselves recognized and urged the need for
improvements in the administrative process, the Walter-Logan provisions represented
a deliberate effort to hogtie administrative regulation. They viewed it as reflecting
fear of "bureaucracy" and a threat to legislative authority; an unwillingness to accept
the administrative process as a proper mode of action in American governmental life;
and a predilection to identify the security of the canons of due process with tradi-
tional judicial process3P
The specific provisions of the Walter-Logan measure, which had as its immediate
purpose the establishment of uniform procedural regulations for administrative
agencies, dealt with the following matters: (i) issuance of rules and regulations;
(2) administrative adjudication of controversies between the government and a
citizen; and (3) judicial review of final orders and decisions of administrative
agencies.
By the terms of the bill, administrative rules were to be issued only after publica-
tion of notice and public hearings. All rules and regulations that were in existence
on the date of enactment were required to be reconsidered, after public notice and
hearing, by the issuing agency, if such consideration was requested by any person
substantially interested in the effects of the rule or regulation in question. Such
requests were to be made within one year following enactment. Further, all rules
and regulations were to be issued within one year of enactment of the authorizing
statute, but could be amended and modified at a later date. Approved rules were to
be published in the Federal Register, and any individual acting in good faith in
accord with a published rule was to be protected for thirty days after publication
notice in the Register of either a rescinding of the rule or a holding of invalidity.
In addition, within thirty days of publication of a rule or regulation in the Register,
any person substantially interested in the effects of a rule could petition the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to enter a declaratory judgment
that would determine whether the rule was in conflict with the Constitution or with
its authorizing statute, or whether it issued under the proper authority. This review
by the Circuit Court was to be final.
"To prevent arbitrary and irresponsible action by administrative officers in the
'
5 Landis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HARv. L. Rsv. 1077 (1940); Jarctzki, The
Administrative Law Bill: Unsound and Unworkable, 2 LA. L. REv. 294 (1940); Remarks of F. Blachly,
printed as part of the Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 Senate Judiciary Committee on . ..and
H.R. 6324, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. 156 (1939).
CONGRESS
administration of ... statutes and the rules and regulations issued thereunder," the
Walter-Logan bill provided that a person aggrieved by an administrative decision
could, within twenty days, address a written petition to the agency head, state
therein the nature of his objection, and, at the same time, request a hearing. The
head of the agency was to designate an intra-agency hearing board of three, one of
whom was to be a lawyer. The number of boards was to vary with the need for
them; such boards were to meet at various places throughout the country. The
individual aggrieved was to be allowed to call his own witnesses; he could cross-
examine government witnesses and compel production of documents. Further, the
complainant did not have to petition the agency to issue a subpoena; by the
language of the act, he had the right to request such action by the agency. A copy
of the proceeding was to be given to the complainant, and within thirty days, the
intra-agency board was to file written findings of fact and a written decision. The
authority to approve, disapprove, or modify rested with the agency head. Where
independent agencies were involved (defined as those with two or more officers at
the head), the act specified that such agencies could, by rule, provide for an initial
hearing by the trial examiner. Following the submission of his written findings of
fact and decision with the agency and the complainant, the agency would hold a
hearing only if the complainant filed written objections. Where agencies had
three chief officers, the hearing could be held by these three; where there were fewer
than three, the intra-agency board technique was to be utilized.
Those who supported the Walter-Logan legislation held a strong conviction of
the need to establish not only uniform procedures of judicial review for all admin-
istrative orders and decisions, but uniform rules as well that would define the scope
of judicial review. Accordingly, by the terms of the legislation proposed, within
thirty days after notice of a final agency order or decision, any party to a proceeding
could file a written petition for review with the circuit court of appeals where he
resided, where he had his principal place of business, where the controversy arose, or,
with the Court of Claims, if the cause of action was within that court's jurisdiction.
The court could affirm or nullify the agency decision or order, remand the matter
for further evidence, or direct the agency to modify its decision. Several grounds for
reversal were prescribed. Decisions were to be final, except for the allowance of
review by the Supreme Court on certiorari or certification. And, "as a final rule of
uniformity," it was specified that a court that found itself in disagreement with
a previously rendered opinion of another court was to certify the matter to the
Supreme Court.
Justifying grounds for legislation along the lines of the Walter-Logan bill, as
viewed by its supporters, may be summarized as follows. First, unlike actions at
law and equity, the administrative process had no uniform procedure for hearings
and no uniform method or determined scope of judicial review. Second, given such
a lack of uniformity, administrative agencies were not disposed to heed decisions of
either other administrative agencies or the courts, nor were they helped much if
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they did. Third, where statutes had not been devised as guidelines for improve-
ments in the administrative process, the consequences were ad hoc procedures in
the agencies, with accompanying unnecessary fumbling and undeserved criticism of
courts that sought to define rules for trial or appellate proceedings. There were
those who saw in the Walter-Logan measure a means of reversing
the drift into parliamentarism which ... could but result in totalitarianism with complete
destruction of the division of governmental power... and with the entire subordination
of both the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government to the executive
branch wherein are included the administrative agencies and tribunals of that Government.
There were others for whom the measure spelled a rejuvenation of congressional
authority, the security of a government of laws, and freedom from administrative,
and more specifically departmental, absolutism.'
Adverse reactions to the legislation were prompt and vigorous, and criticism was
directed to virtually all sections of the bill. Prominent individuals in the legal
profession and several significant segments of the bar withheld support of the bill,"
although the American Bar Association itself officially endorsed the Walter-Logan
measure. Passed by Congress in 1940, the bill was vetoed by President Roosevelt
in December of that year. In his veto message, the President indicated his desire to
wait for the report and recommendations of the recently created Attorney-General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure "before approving any measure in this
complex field." The message reflected, however, the view of those who had sharply
criticized the proposed legislation, for it stated :"s
... . The very heart of modern reform administration is the administrative tribunal.
Great interests, therefore, which desire to escape regulation rightly see that if they can
strike at the heart of modern reform by sterilizing the administrative tribunal which
administers them they will have effectively destroyed the reform itself.
That the presidential veto was sustained by Congress is not surprising, however,
notwithstanding the originally substantially favorable vote and the impassioned pleas
in behalf of the bill. There was also in Congress, at this time, a well-articulated
awareness of the dangers inherent in the Walter-Logan bill, for as Kenneth C. Davis
has pointed out, 9
Its proponents seemed fully aware of its devastating character, for they exempted from its
provisions the agencies whose work they were anxious to protect.
e 84 CONG. REc. 9392 (1939)-
1 7 Strongly opposed were the Committees on Administrative Law and on Federal Legislation of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and Louis Caldwell who said, "With minor exceptions,
it is difficult to know just what agencies and what quasi-judicial functions are reached by this bill that
are not already equipped with at least equal and usually superior machinery." 86 CoNG. REc. App.
2223 (z940).
"I1d. at 13942-43, and reprinted in Message from the President of the United States, Providing
for the Expeditious Settlement of Disputes with the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1940).
19 1 DAvis, op. ct. supra note I, § 1.04.
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The Walter-Logan bill marks the extreme in efforts by Congress to accomplish
a drastic overhaul of the machinery for administrative regulation. As described by
one commentator:
20
The bill contained gross infirmities. It prescribed a single, impossibly rigid procedure
for rule-making and subjected almost every administrative action to judicial review, on
questions of law and fact, and for almost any conceivable reason. It proposed a steriliza-
tion of the administrative process.
James M. Landis asserted that it would "cut off here a foot and there a head, leaving
broken and bleeding the processes of administrative law."' What the actual conse-
quences would have been we cannot know, because the Walter-Logan bill never
became law. The presidential veto thwarted what was, at the moment at least, the
recorded majority will of Congress. 22
II
REFoR THROUGH A GENERAL CODE OF PROCEDURE
In the years that followed the defeat of the Walter-Logan measure, several
developments transpired: the report of the Attorney-General's Committee was
published, and legislative measures proposed by both a majority and minority of that
committee were recommended; the American Bar Association drafted and adopted
a declaration of principles that, in its view, would provide a proper conceptual
framework of subsequent administrative procedure legislation; a subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the Attorney-General's report;
in August 1943, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association authorized
its administrative law committee to draft legislation that would further the objective
of fair administrative practice and, following Association approval, to work for the
enactment of such legislation; and in June 1944, bills were introduced, followed by
revisions in 1945, that provided the principal essentials of the APA.
Throughout this period, congressional concern with the administrative process,
as well as external pressures upon Congress for its reform, continued to be vigorous-
and, in one respect, consistent. Conceptually, the problem remained one of con-
flict between two types of governmental action, administrative and judicial2
Writing in 194o, Walter Gellhorn could speak of agreement in the legal profession
that "judicial review of administrative decisions is a poor substitute for good admin-
10 RiN T J. SWENSON, FEDERAL ADNINISTRATIVE LAW 121 (1952).
" Landis, supra note 15, at 1102.
22 What Congress failed to focus on in this bill is in many ways more revealing of its perceptions
than what it actually tried to enact. Specifically: (i) the Government would not stand on an equal
footing with a corporation or individual when a rule was contested; (2) no distinctions were drawn
between substantive, interpretive, and procedural rules; (3) informal administrative proceedings were
ignored; (4) the problem of the combination of the prosecutor-judge function was scarcely touched; (5)
the qualifications and tenure of the hearing officers were not dealt with; and (6) recognition of the
diversity of functions within agencies was lacking.
"See generally MacMahon, The Ordeal of Administrative Law, 25 IOWA L. Ray. 425 (1940).
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istrative decisions in the first place."2 4  He could not, either as an observer of
the administrative scene or of its critics, record much in the way of unity where dis-
cussion arose as to the most desirable means of achieving good administrative de-
cisions. In this period of the early 'forties, the legislative antecedents of the APA
were numerous and their provisions reflected a jockeying between conceptions-that
which characterized the Walter-Logan legislation and that which ultimately char-
acterized the APA.
The provisions of that Act may be broadly summarized; the congressional mood
that its acceptance reflected may be variously interpreted. The significance of the
Act may similarly be variously regarded. But whatever the construction put upon
legislative motive and administrative impact, the following points stand out in any
consideration of the APA. First, whatever its deficiencies, in its drafting or opera-
tion, the Act reflected acceptance of the administrative process to the point where
legislative authority would be utilized to improve that process, not to restrict it to
the point of crippling. Second, the language of the statute reflected awareness of the
functional diversities implicit in regulation. Third, it has had the consequence of
allowing Congress and the agencies a measure of flexibility for dealing with those
niceties of procedure and substance that are not readily discernible in the elemental
stages of any emergent governmental process. Congressional efforts, via the APA,
to cope with the impact of the administrative process upon the traditional canons
of due process, as they relate to personal and property rights, may well have the
ultimate result of an ever-increasing congressional involvement in administrative
operations.
The courts have, over a wide range of specifics, construed the "intent" of Congress
in enacting the APA, but the congressional mood is perhaps best described by
focusing on the areas in which Congress acted: publicity of administrative material
(rules, orders, regulations, procedures); systematization in administrative operations
(rule-making, adjudication, hearing procedures, role of the trial examiner); and
provision for judicial review, a "remedy for every legal wrong."
In the words of one observer, the APA represented an effort to answer the
questions,2
5
how to assure public information, how to provide rule-making where no formal hearing
is provided, how to assure fairness in adjudications, how to limit sanctions, how to state
all the essentials of a right to judicial review, and how to make examiners independent.
For Senator McCarran, the APA was a "bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands
of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated ... by agencies of the Federal
Government."26 The legislative history of the Act reveals a view of the need for such
legislation that was grounded on three principal points: (I) that the subject of
23 Gellhorn, Introductory Remarks to Symposium on Procedural Administrative Law, id. at 42x, 423.
For a "capsule" view of the changing problems in administrative life, compare MacMahon, supra note
23, with Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process, 69 YALE LJ. 965 (i96o).
"
5 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative History, S. Doe. No.
248, 79 th Cong., 2d Sess. 295 (946).
" Id. at 298.
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administrative law and procedure was not mentioned in the Constitution; (2) that
there was no extant recognizable body of administrative law for administrative
agencies as there were substantive and procedural guidelines for courts; and (3) that
there were further no clearly recognizable legal guides for the public or admin-
istrators in the implementing of administrative process. The APA, therefore, was
designed to achieve the following: issuance, by agencies, as rules, of certain specified
information as to administrative organization and procedure; statement of the
essentials of the several forms of administrative proceedings and general limitations
on administrative powers; provision in more detail of the requirements for
administrative hearings and decisions in cases in which statutes require such hear-
ings; and a simplified statement of judicial review of administrative acts. By the
terms of the Act, administrative rule-making and administrative adjudication were
distinguished. Rule-making procedures were characterized by flexibility and in-
formality, whereas procedure in adjudication was more formalized and followed
judicial procedure more closely. Aside from requirements concerning publicity and
the effective date of rules, the legislation merely afforded interested persons the
opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments and required the agency
to consider relevant matters submitted. Oral presentation at a hearing was optional
with the rule-making agency, although the APA did make provision, in special cir-
cumstances, for a more formal rule-making procedure patterned after adjudicative
procedure. With respect to administrative adjudication, the key provisions in the
APA established a semi-independent corps of hearing examiners who would preside
in cases not heard by agency heads and who could issue initial or recommended
decisions.
The language of the APA broadened the base for judicial review of administrative
actions and reflected adherence, on the one hand, to the generally accepted sub-
stantial evidence rule, but rejection, on the other, of limitations upon the reviewing
court that would permit review of one side of the evidence only.
Four years after enactment of the APA, Mr. Justice Jackson said that it "repre-
sents a long period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought
contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces
have come to rest."2 That the APA was a landmark in the strife surrounding the
administrative process is certain. But today, in ig6, it is hard to discern exactly
what contentions were settled, harder to set forth the precise formula presumed to
have brought peace to the contending forces, and still harder to justify the claim that
opposing forces have, indeed, come to rest.
ImI
EM ING TxqN-s AND DzvFoPm-Ers
In recent years, Congress has again become the arena in which consideration is
being given to issues of administrative regulation, both old and new. The interim
27 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
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nature of the settlement of the 194o's, as represented by the APA, has become more
and more apparent, but it is too early to discern clearly what patterns of revision will
emerge during the decade of the i96o's.
The many and serious problems confronting the administrative process currently
have led many of its critics to charge that administrative agencies are not "doing
their job."2 Earlier attacks on the administrative process turned on constitutional
questions. 9 Subsequent criticism hammered away at the need for procedural re-
quirements to conform more closely to judicial proceduresf0 The "not doing the
job" critics, however, may well represent one of the most formidable sources of
opposition, for the implication of their argument is that administrative agencies can-
not do the job, absent certain restrictive changes. It may be argued that it is not for
lack of ability that some agencies do not function effectively, but for (i) a want of
congressional concern with a wide gamut of policy questions that affect day-to-day
administrative processes, and (2) a continued lack of clarity in legislative-admin-
istrative relationships.
In the tangled web of these relationships, certain points stand out: the element
of political support so necessary for administrative programs; legislative devices for
control of administration that are not always clearly apparent;3 ' legislative control
devices that are all too apparent and that provide a vehicle for congressional crippling
of administrative efforts;" the practical need of the legislature to rely on agencies
or regulatory commissions; the positive, beneficial aspects of congressional interest
in administrative matters; 3 the compromise nature of those legislative mandates
28 MAuv-m H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusiNEss BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (955); Hector, Prob-
lems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (196o) [this report
has been published as a committee print by the Senate Committee on Government Organization, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (196o), and is hereinafter cited as HECToR MEMORANDUM].
" For a detailed discussion, see Cushman, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 13, 163 (1935).
"oHearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 674, S. 675,
and S. 9r8, 7 7 th Cong., ist Sess. (941). See also McFarland, Stason, Vanderbilt Report, in Senate
Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No.
8, 7 7 th Cong., Ist Sess. 203 (194).
"l Statutory provisions, where they define agency relationships, "run a gamut, permitting the exchange
of information, providing formally prescribed sources of advice, compelling agencies to consult, to consult
and consider, to consult prior to taking specific action, hinging action to the receipt of a prior enabling
report or request, requiring prior consultation and fact finding, requiring clearance or approval from a
source external to the agency, and finally, compelling action in conformance with the request of another
agency." See generally Cotter & Smith, Administrative Responsibility: Congressional Prescription of
Interagency Relationships, Xo W. POL. Q. 765, 782 (1957) [reprinted as Stanford University Political
Sciences Series No. 62].
8Among the more obvious devices: (i) undue number of watchdog committees; (2) improper
congressional pressures on matters pending before agencies; (3) appointment of high-level administrative
personnel to satisfy political and interest pressures, rather than reliance on merit and suitability; and (4)
detailed committee hearings, on proposed contracts, which have a "pressure effect," despite the inadequacy
of a congressional committee to validate or invalidate a contract. Two excellent discussions in point are
Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolution and Committees, 66 HA^V.
L. REV. 569 (1952); Morrisson, Federal Support of Domestic Atomic Power Development, 12 VAND. L.
Rav. 195 (1958).
" The congressional tradition of reference has led on occasion to serious problems of ethics. However,
positive aspects of the tradition are pointed up by testimony in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Administrative Process and Ethical Ques-
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that the administrative process must implement; and the need of the administration
to convert "the controversial into the routine." Yet, considerations such as these,
which describe crucial relationship points of legislative-administrative life, are deeply
involved with certain, if not most, of the major problems that confront the admin-
istrative process. Congress has shown no great haste in the direction of new admin-
istrative procedure legislation, although considerable legislation has been proposed.
But Congress is, by hearings and agency surveys, addressing itself to specific thorny
spots in administrative life.
Friends of the administrative process must also be its strongest critics. The
staunchest supporters of that process can scarcely fail to perceive that there are
prominent problems in administrative life: there is, unquestionably, in many in-
stances, a level of expense and delay in administrative proceedings that defeats an
essential purpose of administrative process; there are serious questions that can be
raised with respect to "expertise" in administration, particularly at the decision-
making level; comment has ranged far and wide as to the responsibility of agency
heads to write decision-making opinions; considerable attention has been directed
to the problem of voluminous records that emerge from administrative proceedings
upon which decisions and appeals must be based, as well as the tangential and
derivative problem of ex parte communications; the question of the desirability of
general fact pleading has, in terms of quick and precise illumination of issues, come
to the fore; the entire area of informal procedures, described by the Attorney-
General's Committee as early as 1941, as "the life blood of the administrative
process," requires continuing appraisal; and the need is increasingly apparent for
reliable information on the present and potential operating capacity of an agency and
the staffing and management problems that are involved as a consequence !
In terms of specifics, these are but a few of the knotty questions with which
Congress must come to grips. But the shortcomings of administrative life go beyond
such specifics. Above and beyond procedural questions is the need to rethink the
role of regulatory commissions and agencies, their position in the structure of gov-
ernment, and the degree to which responsibility and authority are meshed. Al-
though his remarks were directed principally to regulatory commissions, the recent
statements of the Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget before a congressional
subcommittee are of interest generally, for he said:,"
Policy decisions of far-reaching importance are committed to the heads of regulatory
agencies. The Bureau of the Budget suggests that the Senate consider whether they
should not have the authority and the discretion to adopt the organization and procedure
tions, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). James Landis noted, for example, that during his tenure as CAB
Chairman, proper decisions relevant to air feeder service were facilitated by congressional interest. Id.
at xxi. See also Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators
Supervise Administrators?, 41 CALxF. L. REV. 565 (953).
"Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on S. Res. 234, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (ig6o). An" informative account
is given of the results of two or more management firm surveys, 1953-6o, of problem areas of regulatory
agencies.
" Hearings, supra note 34, at 53.
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which would assure fair and equitable administration, and also would be suited to their
respective activities and the industries with which they deal ...
In the early years of regulation, the legislative mandate indicated with some clarity
the economic or social program visualized. Today, in too many instances, the
legislative mandate is not clear, is outdated, or is not revealed. Further, there is,
as James M. Landis suggests, a need for creative thinking by administrative groups.
But the benefits of the most uniquely creative approach are likely to be minor if
Congress, given the practical realities of technological and economic complexity, fails
to recognize that procedure is the instrument of administrative fair play, in the
larger social and constitutional sense, only when it does not shape substantive action
away from the objectives for which the administrative agency exists. Today, in the
area of administrative regulation, Congress must address itself to two primary
matters: (i) the determination of those principal problems that do, in fact, hinder
administrative effectiveness and the fair disposition of administrative justice; and
(2) the need to assess the range of its own role in administrative life, or, put
differently, the question of whether the quest for control of governmental admin-
istration can be met "by arduous feats of legislation."
It remains yet to be seen whether Congress will see fit to tackle some of the
current problems of administrative life by (i) piecemeal changes in existing require-
ments as to procedure; (2) legislation that would focus on changes in the structural
organization of the administrative process; (3) an emphasis on the possibilities of
agency self-improvement; (4) a new uniform code; or, (5) resort to increased
congressional oversight.
As used here, the term "piecemeal changes" includes either of two possible courses
of legislative action: formal amendment of the APA, or statutory additions to other
legislation that regulates the administrative process. Congress might choose to meet
certain immediate and pressing problems in this fashion. For example, the House
Legislative Oversight Subcommittee has proposed that those in the regulatory
agencies who make the decisions shall be required to write the opinions themselves
or direct the writing of them personally. 6  The notion of "anonymous opinion-
writing" has been strongly criticized in some quarters on the grounds that "it
creates a blank facade, behind which the individual commissioners become mere
shadowy figures on the bench.137  Further, it is argued, if commissioners lack the
technical know-how and rationalization know-how of the opinion-writers, and if
the opinions and decisions suffer thereby, a benefit will, nonetheless, result-namely,
the bringing of "appellate review into closer conformance with the judicial theory
on which it rests."'  Third, the practice of group opinion-writing is held to be
contrary to the view expressed in 1941 by the Attorney General's Report on Admin-
"' Special Subcomm. on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Independent Regulatory Commissions, H.R. REP. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 41
(I959) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 2711.]
"' Hector, Government by Anonymity, 45 A.B.A.J. 126o, 1264 (x959).
as Ibid.
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istrative Procedure that "the heads of the agency should do personally what the
heads purport to do.' 30 Built into the criticism of the group opinion-writing
process is the notion that review of the record by those who are entrusted with the
decision-making authority is somehow inadequate. But, as Kenneth C. Davis
states :
40
Despite its immediately appealing quality, the broad ideal that agency heads should
do personally what they purport to do is for many functions impractical and unworkable.
... Increased subdelegation is clearly indicated. Decisions by panels of or divisions of
agencies may help. But a rigid enforcement in all circumstances of a requirement that
agency heads must read all records in all cases is not the answer, however appealing that
idea might be in the abstract.
The problem of review by administrative officers and the related question of sub-
delegation are beyond the scope of this paper, but both questions are patently
tangential to the matter of personalized opinion-writing, for there are those who
believe that41
.*. if the members of an agency do, in fact, decide the cases that come before them, and
if in order to decide these cases they go through all the requisite mental processes, then
there should be little extra burden in setting these mental processes down in an opinion.
But if, as a matter of fact, they do not go through the requisite mental processes, then
their decisions are in reality not supported by the necessary legal and factual foundations
and are not rendered in accordance with law.
Agency criticism of any legislative proposal like that of the Harris subcommittee
turns on points of efficiency, the more likely achievement of a "blending of views"
where the opinion is not personalized, and consistency in agency opinions-a feature
viewed as threatened by prescription for mandatory personalized opinions4 None-
theless, the possibility of congressional action in this direction must be reckoned with,
given strong pressures to "bring together the decision-making process and the facts
in the case."4
3
Conceivably, Congress may choose to focus on problems pertaining to hearing
examiners via "piecemeal" legislation. This officer, described as the "alter ego" of
the agency he serves, was, prior to 1941, totally subject to agency controls. From
1941, when the Attorney General's Report was issued, to 1946, when the APA was
enacted, the hearing officer's role reflected a curious blend of dependence and in-
" Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies, S. Doe. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 52 ('941).
40 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note i, § M07.
"'Hector, Government by Anonymity, 45 A.B.A.J. i26o, 1332 (1959).
"s Civil Aeronautics Board, Analysis and Evaluation of the Hector Memorandum to the President,
March 29, 1960 [noted in WALTER GELLHORN & CLAnK BYSE, ADMINISTRATVE LAw 1115 (4 th ed.
196o)]; Kintner, supra note 24.
"'The disadvantages inherent in the separation of opinion-writing from the decision-makirng process
were pointed out as early as 1938 by James Landis. But, as Kenneth C. Davis currently states, "The
objection to the separation of deciding from opinion writing may be unanswerable except in terms of
inevitability. No one has yet conceived a system which will dispose of the quantity of adjudication,
without an undue diversity of results, and will at the same time permit the deciding officers to write
their own opinions." 2 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note x, § ii.ii.
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dependence with respect to his functions and his relationship with the agency. There
are many who hold that the dimensions of this office could have developed along
substantially different lines,44 but Congress in the APA clearly followed the "push"
of the Attorney-General's Report. In enacting the APA, Congress plainly did not
promote the hearing examiner to a position that would deny an agency effective
power or grant him authority comparable to that of a trial judge. Via the APA,
Congress strengthened the role of the examiner with respect to both the conduct
of hearings and the filing of initial or recommended decisions. Yet, by legislative
provision and judicial construction, 5 the status of the hearing officer has been
pegged at a subordinate, if increasingly prestigeful, level. There are those who,
in surveying the role of the hearing examiner, (i) plead the need for greater
assistance to him-legal, clerical, statistical, analytical-given the voluminous records
he reviews; (2) urge that greater weight be accorded his decisions; and (3) argue
for the elimination of interlocutory appeals from proceedings, barring the examiner's
permission. The status generally of the hearing examiner (including salary, rank,
promotion) poses prominent questions.0 But, despite a growth in prestige of the
examiner, and despite increased recognition of his scope of effort, it is evident that
agencies continue to regard the examiner as their alter ego; second, that they persist
in the view that adjudicatory matters before a commission are not routine factual
determinations, but problems of policy determination for which the agency is re-
sponsible; and third, that agencies are opposed to any effort to place examiners in a
position of independence vis-a-vis the agency whose cases they hear.47 In Judge
Friendly's view,48
... the same considerations that oppose a separation of adjudication and policy show the
limits on deference to decisions by hearing examiners .... In those few cases in which the
agency is simply applying a definite rule to the facts, the decision of the hearing examiner
should be conclusive unless the commission grants review, and it should exercise great
abstinence in doing that. In the cases in which fact finding and policy determination are
mingled, deference should be paid to the examiner's findings on the facts; and it would
be well if examiners were encouraged to devote more effort to this part of their work...
rather than to spend time and thought, at least in the great cases, in preparing arguments
and conclusions to which the commissioners surely will not and perhaps ought not give
much weight.
"Kenneth C. Davis notes the following as major developmental stages in the role of the examiner,
prior to enactment of the APA: (i) initially, under the enabling acts of the early regulatory agencies, the
totally subordinate position of the hearing examiner; (2) "the ICC experience of finding some degree of
one-man responsibility desirable for some proceedings and group responsibility desirable for others" as a
basis for developing the examiner role; and (3) the impulse, generated by the Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure, towards an increase in power and status which "has been strongly felt
ever since." 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note i, § io.O.
"'Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
4' PREsmaEr's CONFERENcE ON ADMINIsTRATIVE PRocEDuRE, REPORT 62 et seq. (1955); Hearings,
supra, note 30; Fuchs, The Hearing Oflcer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 281
(1955).
"
T See generally STAFF OF SENATE COIsM. ON THE JUDMcARY, 85TH CONG., 2D S-SS., SUMa.iY' AND
COMPILATION OF DEPARTmENTL AND AGENCY REPORTS ON S. 932 (Comm. Print 1958).
"'Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 6o COLUM. L. REv. 429, 443-44 (196o).
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Whether Congress will move within the confines of principle that holds as desirable
a "semi-independent" role for the hearing examiner, if it does seek to improve the
status of the hearing examiner, remains to be seen. But any congressional action
should reflect the admonition of one distinguished observer of the administrative
process :49
What should be the status of the examiner? The answer must obviously depend upon
what his functions should be.... To begin with the idea of life tenure and high salary and
to build around that idea would be to begin at the wrong end. The starting point must
be to discover what functions examiners do and should perform. The status must depend
upon the functions....
Of late, Congress has concerned itself increasingly with the problem of ethical
standards in the federal government. It has addressed itself, as well, to the question
of how such standards, once described, are to be enforced. Any one likely course
of congressional action is impossible to predict, for the "problems of ethics" differ
in kind; and legislative action, if desirable at all, must reflect this difference. Indi-
vidual conduct, reflective of a wide range of group-interests, gives rise to a consider-
able portion of the criticism that clamors for more precise standards of official
behavior. But, as one congressional subcommittee noted, much criticism of official
behavior "
. . . has to do with situations or institutional arrangements which aggravate pressures
or make it more difficult for a public servant to act independently, ie., to judge issues on
their merits.
The entire issue of consultation is very much in point here. The question-
should deciding officers, at initial or final stages of decision, be allowed to consult
staff members who have not been investigators or prosecutors in the case-involves,
inter alia, the "use of ideas or advice from extra record sources."' The congressional
stand on this question has varied significantly:52
The Taft-Hartley Act seems to express congressional dislike for consultation except
between the examiner and members of the Board. The 1952 amendments to the Com-
munications Act are far more restrictive than any other legislation.... The Immigration
Act of 1952 moves in the opposite direction, removing all restrictions on consultation by
deciding officers, even to the extent of legalizing consultation of investigators and
prosecutors.
The most important congressional position is that taken in the APA, which leaves agency
heads free to consult any staff members except investigators or prosecutors, but which
forbids examiners to consult off the record any person or party on any fact in issue.
Remedies proposed in the last ten years, with respect to external pressures upon
individual official conduct, fall into the following categories: (i) the enactment of a
40 2 DAvis, op. ct. supra note I, § 1o.oi.
50 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 82D CONG., iST SEss.,
ETHIcAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT 19 (Comm. Print 1951). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 2711; Hearings, supra
note 33.
512 DAvis, op. cit. supra note i, §§ II.08-1L18, 11.21.
"I1d. § 11.21.
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formal code of ethics that would govern the conduct of commissioners, commission
employees, practitioners, and others who appear before the commissions; 5 3 (2)
legislation that would require mandatory disclosure of income, assets, and transac-
tions in securities and commodities; (3) amendments to the APA that would deal
with a variety of defined improper practices (e.g., appearances of former federal
officials and employees before agencies in which they were formerly employed in
cases which they previously handled or of which they had some direct knowledge,
and acceptance of valuable gifts or services directly or indirectly from any person or
organization with which the official or employee transacts business for the govern-
ment); (4) changes in the criminal law relating to bribery, conflicts of interest,
and ex parte communications in quasi-judicial cases; 54 (5) the establishment of a
Commission on Ethics in Government that would investigate ethical standards
in government in the interest primarily of "moral dynamics" rather than "abstract
standards"; (6) the establishment of a Committee on Ethical Standards, if a code
of ethics is enacted, to (a) adjudge violations, (b) render advisory opinions con-
cerning ethical questions submitted to it, (c) promulgate interpretive rulings, and
(d) recommend amendments and additions to the code; and (7) steps to upgrade
the caliber of appointees to administrative positions.t 5
Those who argue in favor of a code of ethics are confronted by several significant
counterarguments. First, personal integrity and courage of governmental personnel
are the well-springs of ethical behavior as officials. Even in the presence of undue
pressures and influence peddling, it still, as the saying goes, "takes two to tango."
Second, there is merit to the view that one can rarely create morality by pronounce-
ment. Third, enactment of a general code would not release individual agencies
from the need to identify and deal with their own unique ethical problems. If
Congress should choose to move in the direction of "ethics by statute"--and, given
recent events, it may choose to do so-it will still have to come to grips with three
"' See generally Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. Res. 61, 86th Cong., ist Sess. (959); Hearings, supra note 34.
See also Huard, Influence in Federal Agency Law Making and Adiudicatory Proceedings-Should We
Adopt a Code of Agency Ethics?, ii AD. L. BULL. 22 (1958).
"In Senator Douglas's view, the distinction, drawn by S. 2374, between adjudicating and rule-
making procedures should not stand for purposes of defining standards of propriety of ex parte com-
munications. He argues that there are adversaries in rule-making proceedings, just as in adjudication,
and that "fairness" does not turn on the label of "rule making" or "adjudication."
" Proposals designed to improve the caliber of administrative personnel fall into two categories, the
pious and the practical. The former stresses the need for the President to appoint eminently able men
and for the Senate to evaluate them in terms of merit, not politics. The practical suggestions contemplate
lengthier tenure for commissioners, legislation dealing with the practice of appointments for unexpired
terms of agency members, studies in salary policy, vigorous staff recruitment of high-caliber legal per-
sonnel, and encouragement of career staff people to work toward appointment as an' agency member.
The proposal most recently suggested recommends legislation to increase the terms of regulatory agency
members to uniform terms of ten years, together with an annual increment in salary and improved
retirement benefits. See Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Administrative Practice and Procedure, S. REP.
No. 168, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. x68]. See also Kintner, Federal
Administrative Law in the Decade of the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J. 269, 272-73 (i96i); Hearings Before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Major Administrative
Process Problems, 86th Cong., ist Sess. (x959).
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major needs: (i) Congress, in approving administrative appointments, must follow
carefully drawn stand:rds, not politics; (2) certain major policy areas require either
a statement, clarification, or redefinition of congressional intent; and (3) it must not,
in an effort to cope with improper pressures, "surround the Government service with
so many snares, snags, and spring-guns that only the unwary can be recruited."5 6
Turning to another possible congressional approach-namely, legislation that
would affect the administrative structure-we note the suggestion made by Mr.
Hector in his now famous and much-answered memorandum."7 In his view, con-
gressional regulation would be more specific and executive responsibility enhanced
if (i) policy functions of agencies were transferred to the executive branch; (2)
the adjudicating function was placed in an administrative court; and (3) policy-
making and planning became the responsibility of a single agency head.
In essence, this approach follows the course of action proposed by the President's
Committee on Administrative Management.58 Congress, however, has been re-
luctant, except in isolated instances, to support these views.
Proposals to establish a Federal Office of Administrative Practice, comparable
to the suggestion of the Attorney General's Committee in 1941, have also drawn
congressional interest. The creation of a continuing, independent body in the
executive branch of the government that could study problem areas in administra-
tive life and report on its findings to the President and the Congress is regarded in
many quarters as an eminently desirable step. Testimony before the Carroll sub-
committee, however, raised significant discussion as to the scope of authority to be
accorded such an office and, more specifically, its director. There is, apparently, con-
siderable agency concern that with respect to problems of administrative procedure,
anything more than an advisory role for a director would lead to difficulties, given
existing statutory requirements. 9
If Congress follows a course in response to the recommendations of the Landis
report, ° it will, by basic structural changes, reach towards the achievement of what
James Landis terms "a prime and immediate need"-to develop and coordinate policy
immediately at a high staff level. Such a course might require congressional support
of the President that would allow the latter to propose reorganization plans; con-
gressional support of reorganization plans that would clarify the scope of authority
of the chairmen of certain major regulatory agencies; congressional support of re-
organization plans that would strengthen the position of the President vis-a-vis the
FPC and the ICC; and congressional support, by statute, of the organization of a
C H.R. REP. No. 2711, at 88.
'T HECTOR MEMORANDUM.
s PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEIENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES (1937).
50 STAFF OF SENATE CoMM . ON THE JUDICIARY, Op. cit. supra note 47; see also Remarks of Walter
Gellhorn in Hearings, supra note 34.
00 JAMiES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (i960) [this report
has been published as a committee print by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (ig6o)].
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secretariat to assume the duties performed by the Office of Administrative Procedure,
which currently is located in the Department of Justice.6'
Congress may choose to direct its attention to a re-evaluation of its intent in
certain policy areas (e.g., transportation and the notion of constructive coordination)
and a definition or description, however broadly drawn, of some statutory policy in
others (e.g., communications). In the latter instance, the ever-vague concept of the
public interest has controlled over the years, not the terms of a statutory mandate.
Efforts in this direction-namely, changes in basic legislation, might help diminish
the area of the controversial in which the administrator must function. Given any
success in this direction, an important step may have been taken to meet what many
view as a basic problem of regulation-the division of responsibility for manage-
ment:62
If the regulator is given a dear mandate to remove a perceived evil, he has an adequate
and limited basis for validating his interference with management, and management has
a basis for calculating the effects of the interference. But in the absence of a clear
mandate, it is not only inevitable, but appropriate, that regulation take the form of an
accommodation in which industry is the senior partner....
There is very little in our history . . . to indicate that an executive agency will be much
different from an independent agency in periods when public opinion or statutory policy
is slack, indeterminate, or lacking in conviction. The history of the antitrust division of
the Department of Justice, for example, is one of alternation between strict and loose
enforcement of the antitrust laws....
Congressional action to clarify congressional purpose, coupled with piecemeal
amendments to the APA, would strengthen the efforts of agencies to evaluate per-
formance and procedures. If Congress chose to study specific agencies, with a view
to concentrating upon individual agency needs, structurally or procedurally, it would
further stimulate agency efforts at self-improvement. 3 The work of the Advisory
Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law provides a precise example. 4 Con-
gressional recognition that the Taft-Hartley provisions for structural change in the
NLRB (which resulted in "two-headed administration") were "a costly mistake,"
has led to concentrated study of the NLRB, by the Panel, as an agency that, with
respect to areas of concern, type of litigation, and function, is unique. Recommenda-
tions of the Panel, therefore, have been framed, taking into account the distinctive
functions of the NLRB.
Congress has been urged, particularly by the American Bar Association, to adopt
"
1 For a good account of the operations of the Office of Administrative Procedure, see Remarks of
John F. Cushman, Director, Office of Administrative Procedure, Dep't of Justice, in Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Itdiciary on S.
Res. 6r, 86th Cong., ist Sess. 211 et seq. (1959).
62 Jaffe, The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J. 1o68, 1074 (1956).
This approach appears particularly desirable in view of individual agency efforts to improve their
methods and procedures. In the last two years, the AEC adopted a code of ethics; the ICC streamlined
its procedural rules; and the NLRB has almost completed total revision of its administrative rules. S.
RaP. No. 168, at 3.
6
'Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law, Report to the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, S. Doe. No. 8i, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (i96o).
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a Code of Federal Administrative Procedure that would supplant totally the APA.
Analysis of the proposed Code is beyond the scope of this paper, but we should like
to indicate, in broad terms, what its objectives seem to be.
In essentials, the proposed Code reflects the view that procedures must be formal
if they are to be fair, and that the regulatory process will improve in proportion to
the degree to which it becomes "judicialized" in its methods and more direcdy
controlled by the Congress and the courts. For example, the APA definition of rule-
making included agency statements of "particular" application and future effect as
well as statements of general application and future effects. 5 The proposed Code
moves in the direction of formalization of procedure in a definition of rule-making
that, being limited to statements only of general application and future effect, places
statements of "particular" applicability and future effect in the category of adjudica-
tion. Further evidence of the "remarkable vitality of the lawyer's concern with the
administrative process""0 is apparent in the proposed Code's provisions that would
(i) "further restrain adjudicatory proceedings"; 67 (2) significandy alter the role of
the hearing officers;"8 and (3) materially enlarge opportunities for judicial review
of final agency action or proceedings prior to final action.69
In the view of one critic, the proposed Code would place agency heads "between
an upper and a lower millstone," and he added, "I think this code misconceives the
principal problems that should concern us in relation to administrative processes" 70
There is, currendy, considerable congressional sentiment in support of this critical
attitude.71 If Congress chooses to reject the proposed Code as a course of action, it
will, by its choice, give tangible assent to two fundamental points of view: first, the
APA does suffer from many imperfections, but it has been effective and can be made
more effective "given sympathetic and imaginative interpretation"; 72 second, the
problems that confront the administrative process require more for their solution than
"increased formalism in agency proceedings" '73
One further course of congressional action is possible, and perhaps even likely:
substantially increased legislative oversight through reliance on structural and
°' 6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § xooi(c) (1952).
Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273 (1955).
"' Pleadings, for example, are required to conform closely to the pleading requirements in United
States district courts. Code of Federal Administrative Procedure § 1004(a) (proposed).
" In adjudicative proceedings, the hearing officer would be barred from any consultation, even with
members of the agency staff, in the course of formulating an initial decision. Id. § ioo5(c). Further,
hearing officers' decisions on questions of evidentiary fact would be required to stand unless "contrary
to the weight of the evidence." Id. § X007(c).
69 Under the APA, an agency determination of fact may be reversed if unsupported by substantial
evidence. Under the terms of § ioog(f) of the proposed Code, the standard for reversal would be
broadened "to the formula now applicable to appellate review of non-jury district court determinations
of fact, whereby determinations which are clearly erroneous on the whole record may be reversed." Fur-
ther, courts could "stop agency investigations either when the agency comes to court seeking enforcement
of a subpoena or in" a new type of proceeding to enforce agency investigations." Id. § 1005(a), (b).
Is Fuchs, The Proposed New Code of Administrative Procedure, 19 Oso ST. L.J. 423, 431 (1958).
"'See S. RaP. No. i68.
' Id. at ix.
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procedural devices that would increase legislative involvement in the administrative
process.
One possibility of this kind is the proposal to establish a permanent standing
Committee on Administrative Procedure. Such a committee should (i) "screen
and study complaints" relating to agency procedures in the interest of fair play and
due process; (2) ". . . exercise continuous watchfulness over the APA and laws of
like character"; and (3) ". . . determine whether the administrative agencies are
complying with the requirements of the APA and laws of like character, and with
the principles they embody .... 74
This proposal is objected to in some quarters on the ground that it implies,
mistakenly,"5
that the House and Senate Judiciary Committees which handled the Administrative
Procedure Act are no longer competent to deal with this subject . . . that the various
standing committees of the House and Senate with jurisdiction over specific administrative
agencies are no longer competent to oversee the procedure of the agencies committed to
them ... that major changes in administrative procedure somewhat along the lines of the
Second Hoover Commission Task Force Report are in order, and that, because the
Judiciary Committees and other standing committees have failed to act on these pro-
posals, some new committee should be created so to act.
Criticism further goes to the point that a separate committee will not be "oriented
to the substantive role of the agency." 76  In addition, given some of the arguments
advanced to justify a "supercommittee," such a committee might be regarded as a
means by which to press the cause of judicialization. 7
Supporters of the proposal do not deny the necessary relationship of procedure
to substance, but argue (i) there are certain aspects of administrative procedure in
which all administrative agencies share; (2) substantive tasks of the established
committees are vast and necessarily preclude effective oversight of procedure; and
(3) established committees would have continuing contact with all agencies.
If Congress chooses to strengthen its oversight function, there are several other
procedural devices at its disposal that could be relied upon more extensively.
Watchdog committees have dearly demonstrated their capacity to increase legislative
oversight and control. The history of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is a
clear case in point. s Legislative involvement in pending administrative matters;
prior committee clearance of administrative decisions; 79 prior congressional approval
of administrative action by resolution;"0 legislative review of, and authority to annul,
"' See generally Hearings Before a Spedal Subcommittee of the House Committee on Rules, Under
Authority of H. Res. 462, 84 th Cong., 2d Sess. (i956).
" Remarks of T. F. Broden, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on Administrative Process and Ethical Questions, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-05
(1958).
• Ibid.
Hearings, supra note 74, at 81.
7s See Morrisson, supra note 32.
7 See Ginnane, supra note 32.
See Cotter & Smith, Administrative Accountability to Congress: The Concurrent Resolution, 9 W.
POL. Q. 955 (1956).
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federal regulationsS4--these techniques give to Congress a formidable array of
opportunities to become significantly more visible in the administrative process.
CONCLUSION
In its treatment of problems of administrative regulation, Congress has played an
ambivalent role that cannot be clearly analyzed without much more attention than
has yet been given to it. As has been pointed out, the growth of regulatory admin-
istration would not have been possible without congressional sustenance, and Con-
gress has been the prime molder of the regulatory system that has been developed.
Nevertheless, Congress has often shown a mood of apprehension concerning the evil
inclinations of its offspring among the regulatory agencies.
Some of the reasons for this mixture of parental pride and concern can be sur-
mised. Basically and in the long run, Congress has responded positively to what
was perceived as necessary action in enacting regulatory programs and creating
regulatory agencies. Misgivings and second thoughts, leading to control measures,
can be traced tentatively to several sources. One is a natural reluctance on the
part of Congress to disturb the balance of power between the legislative and executive
branches in the direction of executive enhancement-and the regulatory agencies have
increasingly become identified with the executive side of government. As legislators
have realized this, they have frequently reacted in the direction of narrowing the
scope of regulatory action or by shifting much of the work of regulatory agencies
either to the legislature or to the courts.
Another consideration is that opponents of regulatory programs who have failed
to prevent the imposition of regulation have often then turned their efforts toward
hampering restrictions on the effectiveness of regulatory operations and have received
a more sympathetic hearing. Also, Congress has shown a special willingness to
consider favorably suggestions for procedural reforms put forth by spokesmen from
the legal profession-no doubt in part because of the preponderance of lawyers among
the members of both houses. At the same time, the technical complexities of pro-
posed reforms sometimes make it difficult for many members of Congress to make
an informed judgment on measures under consideration.
If Congress has failed to work out a consistent approach or definitive solutions
to the issues posed by the regulatory process, however, the explanation does not lie
primarily in shortcomings of understanding by legislators. Instead, the persistence
of regulatory dilemmas is due to deficiencies in our knowledge of how regulatory
administration actually functions, and a preoccupation with procedural devices for
resolving what are really great issues of public policy. That Congress is becoming
more receptive to a reconsideration of regulatory problems is clearly evident. A
recent Senate subcommittee report s2 offers significant reason to hope that con-
" Sce Schubert, Legislative Adjudication of Administrative Legislation, 7 J. PUB. L. 134 (i958);
Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: The American Experience, 30
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031 (1955).82 S. REP. No. 168.
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gressional action will reflect several of the approaches suggested in this paper.
The subcommittee report shows an awareness of the need to think above and beyond
the procedural questions; it implies that fairness in administrative life is more
complicated to achieve than has perhaps been understood; it proffers the hope
and expresses the need of cooperative legislative-executive relations as each group
tries to upgrade the administrative process. In short, Congress seems to be more
inclined now than ever before to search for concepts that may lead to an admin-
istrative process that is both vigorous and effective in the achievement of its initial
goals, as well as those not yet perceived. There may be "no single center of gravity
in the regulatory system,""3 but Congress is perhaps in the prime position to lay out
the paths for development of administrative regulation.
83 McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. R v. 373, 437
(,961).
